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of the ‘specifi c intellectual’ in the 
context of increasing processes of 
Gleichschaltung in Britain
Summary
In the late nineteenth century, Emile Zola felt the urge 
and intellectual responsibility to challenge the unethical, 
unjust and oppressive operation of the French Republic, 
and wrote an open letter to the President of the Republic 
entitled ‘J’accuse’. The publication of this open letter 
led to the formulation of the Manifeste des intellec-
tuals (1897) that demands a non-party space for the 
expression of an ethically guided politics. ‘J’accuse’ has 
become a generic symbol for the voicing of resistance 
against governmental forms of oppression.
 On the basis of a re-reading of Foucault’s under-
standing of the ‘specifi c intellectual’ (Foucault, 1977 
and 1980), this article suggests that we need a non-party 
space for the public expression of ethically governed 
politics. The article explores some parallels that can be 
drawn between the historical phenomenon of Gleich-
schaltung in Nazi Germany and contemporary politics 
in Britain. While it is acknowledged that the ultimate 
goals and the ‘legitimating’ ideological frameworks 
operating in both regimes are very different, various 
elements of the processes involved in the establishment, 
maintenance and extension of control over the populace 
as well as the increasing muting of resistance show 
remarkable similarities. Paying particular attention to 
policy and practice in relation to housing, education 
and ‘crime control’, contemporary Britain is revealed 
as characterized by processes that have so far resulted 
in opportunistic conformity being the reigning norm of 
a societal life in which former notions of freedom, civil 
rights and self-government have become increasingly 
undermined.
Introduction
This article will explore some of the parallels 
that can be drawn between the historical phe-
nomenon of Gleichschaltung in Nazi Germany 
and contemporary Britain. In its historical con-
text, Gleichschaltung describes the process 
by which the Nazis established a system of 
total control over all aspects of society and 
eliminated all forms of resistance. The period 
from 1933 to 1937 was characterised by the 
systematic suppression and elimination of all 
non-Nazi infl uences on society – such as trade 
union organisations and political parties. Those 
organisations which could not be eliminated – 
such as the Church and schools – were brought 
under direct Nazi control.
A signifi cant event leading to the establishment 
of Nazi Germany was the fi re at the Reichstag 
on the night of 27 February 1933 – alleg-
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edly started by Communist agitators, although 
this was unproven. (Indeed, at Nuremburg, a 
captured general, Franz Halder, claimed that 
Goering had confessed to starting the fi re – 
though Goering himself denied this). Regard-
less, the German Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, 
exploited the situation by declaring a state 
of emergency and persuading President von 
Hindenburg – by then, apparently verging on 
senility – to use Article 48 subsection 2 of 
the Weimar Constitution (which allowed the 
President to take any appropriate measure to 
remedy dangers to public safety) to sign the 
Reichstag Fire Decree – or Verordnung des 
Reichspräsidenten zum Schutz von Volk und 
Staat (Decree of the Reich President for the 
protection of people and state). This ruling 
represented perhaps the fi rst key stage in the 
establishment of Nazi control in Germany – or 
Gleichschaltung. The Decree suspended (until 
further notice) a number of human rights con-
tained in the German constitution: rights to 
personal freedom (habeas corpus); freedom of 
speech; the freedom of the press; the freedom 
to organize and assemble; and the privacy of 
letters, mail, telegraphs and telephones. It also 
allowed personal effects to be seized. The De-
cree also allowed Hitler to have all political ad-
versaries – mainly Communists – intimidated 
or arrested. In this climate of terror, Hitler won 
the Reichstag general elections of March 1933 
with a slim majority. When the newly-elected 
assembly fi rst convened on 23 March it passed 
the Enabling Act (or Ermächtigungsgesetz) 
giving the Chancellor dictatorial power over 
German legislation – a second key stage of 
Gleichschaltung. Shortly afterwards, the Com-
munist Party and the Social Democratic Party 
of Germany (SPD) were both banned (Noakes 
and Pridham, 1984).
An illustration of the process of Gleich-
schaltung can be found in Mark Roseman’s 
account of the Wannsee Conference on the 
‘Final Solution’ – held on 20 January 1942 in a 
grand Berlin villa on the shores of Lake Wann-
see. This meeting was attended by fi fteen top 
Nazi civil servants, and SS and Party offi cials 
who – in a less than two-hour meeting – agreed 
to sentence six million people to death:
Despite the euphemism of evacuation, the minutes 
unmistakably contain a plan for genocide – formu-
lated in sober, bureaucratic language, deliberated 
on in civilized surroundings in a once cosmopoli-
tan suburb of Berlin. Serious, intelligent men had 
conferred together and delved into the details of 
the half-Jew, the quarter-Jew. (Roseman, 2003, 
pp.1-2)
Wannsee remains a powerful symbol of 
Gleichschaltung and the way compliance and 
complicity with Nazi barbarism was secured. 
Roseman suggests radical, racist nationalism 
had been a powerful infl uence. For instance, 
one attendee, Staatssekretär Dr Freisler of 
the Reich Ministry of Justice, had written an 
essay in 1936 entitled ‘The protection of race 
and racial stock in the emerging German legal 
system’ arguing that the racial mixing of previ-
ous centuries in Germany had to be reversed 
(Roseman, 2003).
Contemporary Britain is characterised by simi-
lar processes of Gleichschaltung – albeit to-
wards different goals and adhering to different 
ideologies – that, thus far, have resulted in 
opportunistic conformity becoming the reign-
ing norm of society, in which former notions 
of freedom, civil rights and democracy have 
become entirely fragmented:
When conformity becomes the reigning norm …, a 
process is initiated that leads to an even more fi nely 
tuned streamlining and ranking in accord with that 
norm. (Blacker, 1998, p.352)
This article could therefore also be understood 
as a contribution to research on ‘Crimes of 
obedience’ that are, according to Jamieson, 
defi nable as: ‘Harmful acts committed by a 
subordinate in obedience to the orders of a 
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superior’ (Jamieson, 2001, p.193). Jamieson 
highlights the importance of work conducted 
on this area within criminology:
Social scientifi c work on ‘crimes of obedience’ 
is important for the way it highlights the differ-
ent social contexts and social processes that are 
associated with the production of what otherwise 
might be dismissed (and therefore not explained) 
as immoral, evil or pathological acts. In his writing 
on the Holocaust, for example, Zygmunt Bauman 
has emphasized the inescapable importance of un-
derstanding the processes through which immoral 
regimes are institutionalized and given a ‘normal’ 
authority …. (Jamieson, 2001, in McLaughlin and 
Muncie, p.194)
Given the devastating situation of the ‘order 
of things’ in contemporary Britain discussed 
in this article, the British state should now be 
openly challenged in the name of basic demo-
cratic values. On the basis of a re-reading of 
Foucault’s understanding of the ‘specifi c in-
tellectual’, this article relates its core concerns 
to specifi c localised contexts and suggests that 
it is crucial to re-establish a non-party space 
for the public expression of ethically gov-
erned politics. However, fi rst the ‘historical 
fi eld’ that prepared and started the processes 
of Gleichschaltung will be explored. 
Setting the stage for 
Gleichschaltung: 
British social policy
Processes of Gleichschaltung have become in-
creasingly evident in British social policy since 
the 1980s – coinciding, we would suggest, 
with the rise of the new managerialist hege-
mony within the British welfare state. The un-
derpinning for this development can be traced 
back to the 1960s – evident in such work as 
Policing the Crisis by Stuart Hall et al. (1978) 
which detected inter alia the disintegration 
of the so-called ‘social democratic consen-
sus’ and a shift towards what Hall conceived 
as ‘authoritarian populism’. Hall expanded his 
concept after reading Nicos Poulantzas’s book 
State, Power, Socialism, published in 1978, 
which identifi ed an intensifi cation of state con-
trol over every sphere of society alongside a 
decline in the institutions of democracy and 
curtailment of ‘formal’ civil liberties – a devel-
opment Poulantzas described as ‘authoritarian 
statism’. Hall recognised in Poulantzas’s ac-
count similarities with issues he himself had 
been struggling with in Policing the Crisis. 
However, he took exception to Poulantzas’s 
assessment in two ways. Firstly, Hall suggests 
Poulantzas failed to recognise the ‘anti-stat-
ist’ strategy within the political agenda of the 
emerging neo-liberal New Right – ‘freeing’ 
people from the dependency of the welfare 
state in an appeal to populist sentiments. Sec-
ondly, Hall believed Poulantzas had neglected 
the way advanced capitalist states construct 
popular assent through processes that neu-
tralise and eliminate opposition, and incorpo-
rate elements of popular opinion into their own 
hegemonic project. Building on this refi nement 
of Poulantzas’s thinking, Hall reconceptualises 
‘authoritarian statism’ as ‘authoritarian popu-
lism’ so as to capture the contradictory features 
of the newly emerging social order:
[A] movement towards a dominative and ‘authori-
tarian’ form of democratic class politics – para-
doxically, apparently rooted in the ‘transformism’ 
(Gramsci’s term) of populist discontents. (Hall, 
1988, p.153)
‘Authoritarian populism’ characterises the 
crossing of a major political watershed – consti-
tuting a major new political strategy. It is about 
embarking on a hegemonic project that seeks 
to ‘reconstruct the terrain of what is “taken for 
granted” in social and political thought – and 
so to form a new common sense’ (Hall, 1988, 
p.154). The rise of Thatcherism represented a 
revival of liberal political economy (‘freedom 
to choose’) alongside a new populism focus-
ing on immigration, ‘crime’, unpopular trade 
union practices, social security ‘abuses’, taxa-
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tion, ineffi cient state bureaucracies and other 
‘crises’ ascribed to the decay of the post-war 
settlement. The public sector was portrayed as 
an unproductive burden on the ‘wealth-creat-
ing’ sector and tax payers. Thatcherism, aided 
by the ‘popular’ press, identifi ed the essence 
of the British people as self-reliance and per-
sonal responsibility. Consequently, proposing 
that the role of government should be confi ned 
to maintaining conditions for the ‘market’ to 
function properly – viz. a stable money sup-
ply – seemed ‘common sense’ and allowed the 
Thatcher government (and subsequent gov-
ernments) to extend ‘market criteria’ into all 
areas of welfare organising – health, educa-
tion, ‘social’ housing, social protection and 
social care. Thatcherism rejuvenated elements 
of neo-liberal doctrine, not in the form of an 
economic argument (which does not win votes) 
but in terms of social values that translated 
hard-faced economics into populist moralistic 
discourses – ‘you cannot pay yourself more 
than you earn’, ‘the enemy within’ and ‘cri-
ses of the state’ – which subsequently justify 
‘corrective’ interventions. ‘Crises precipitate 
and make necessary “urgent” action, “serious” 
measures, “wholesale transformation”’ (Rob-
inson and Tormey, 2003, p.6).
The post-war boom had, by the 1960s, become 
a recession followed by a recovery; and then, 
by the end of the 1960s, a full-scale recession. 
Consequently, domestic policy in Britain came 
to be dominated by ‘crisis management’ – viz. 
Keynesian interventionism – mainly under La-
bour. This created a major contradiction for the 
Labour Party. In order to gain electoral sup-
port, Labour needed to be seen to represent 
the interests of the working class and organ-
ised labour whilst, at the same time, showing 
it could manage the economic crisis. Manag-
ing the economy requires solutions which are 
mainly designed to win favour with key sec-
tions of capital and framed within the limits 
of capitalist survival. This requires, therefore, 
not the advancement of working class interests 
but the disciplining of the working class. It is 
because of such a contradiction that Labour’s 
approach to industrial relations collapsed dur-
ing the winter of 1978/79. With the political 
left in disarray, Thatcherism offered an alterna-
tive political trajectory built on traditional val-
ues (‘nation’, ‘the family’, ‘duty’, ‘authority’, 
‘freedom’, ‘standards’) and a revived neo-liber-
alism (‘self-interest’, ‘competitive individual-
ism’, ‘anti-statism’). The repertoire of Thatch-
erism offered a new alliance with the working 
class based on a ‘populist’ unity – a crusade 
to make Britain ‘Great’ once more. Thatcher-
ism operated on both the real and contradictory 
experiences of the population under Labourite 
corporatism, counterposing the sweet sound of 
‘freedom’ against state bureaucracy (at home) 
and the threat of socialism (from central-east-
ern European regimes). 
‘Crises’ of social welfare
Margaret Thatcher was elected to power in 
1979 on a manifesto pledge ‘to restore the 
balance of power in favour of the people’ 
(Conservative Party Manifesto 1979, p.2) and 
against state bureaucracy. Central to this would 
be the creation of a ‘property-owning democ-
racy’ (p.7), partly through the sale of council 
housing. Council housing was perhaps one of 
the most enduring images of the wider failings 
or ‘crisis’ of state welfare in Britain – tower 
blocks in particular emerging as:
… a monstrous emblem of the futility of all State-
led social reform… [A] tombstone not just of coun-
cil housing but of the entire welfare state. (Wright, 
cited in Jacobs and Manzi, 1996, p.548)
Paul Harrison equates the architecture of pub-
lic housing with ‘crimes against humanity’:
The architecture of public housing until the later 
seventies was a catalogue of disasters …. In the 
case of private housing, consumers have the power 
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of money: what they don’t like, they won’t buy. 
With public housing, consumers have no choice 
…. (Harrison, 1983, pp.205-206)
Peter Saunders (1990) described council ten-
ants as a ‘trapped … state-dependent under-
class … clients of a patronage state … locked 
ever more tightly into dependency and power-
lessness’ (Saunders, 1990, pp.369-370).
Such constructions of ‘crises’ with council 
housing since the 1970s have helped to le-
gitimate sustained assaults on the sector – ef-
fectively, the privatisation of council housing 
through the Right to Buy; stock transfer and 
the erosion of the role of local government in 
housing provision; and the widespread pro-
motion of so-called ‘market effi ciency’ and 
‘value for money’ through encouragement for 
owner occupation and the housing association 
movement – all presented as ‘common sense’. 
The rationale for council housing in British 
social policy – the historic failings of the mar-
ket and the housing association movement to 
meet housing need (Burden et al., 2000) – has 
become completely lost. A consequence of 
these measures has been an unprecedented 
rise in homelessness. The number of homeless 
households accepted by local authorities in 
England rose from 110,810 in 1996/97 (shortly 
before New Labour came to power) to 130,000 
in 2003/04, whilst the number of homeless 
households living in temporary accommoda-
tion topped 100,000 for the fi rst time in 2004 
(NHF, 2005).
Another area of social welfare where the notion 
of ‘crisis’ preceded radical intervention is edu-
cation. By the late 1970s, an education system 
that had previously been regarded as largely 
adequate was suddenly considered ‘in crisis’ 
by all major political parties. Labour Prime 
Minister James Callaghan’s Ruskin Speech 
in October 1976 attacked what he called the 
‘educational establishment’ for ‘not adequately 
preparing children for the world of work’ and 
for not realising the higher standards ‘needed 
in a complex world’ (Tomlinson, 2001, p.21). 
However, there was no evidence to support the 
view that education standards had fallen, sug-
gesting that the education system was being 
made a scapegoat for Britain’s economic crisis 
of the late 1970s, and paving the way for the 
radical Thatcher reforms of the 1980s (Tom-
linson, 2001).
On the (ab)uses of language 
by so-called New Labour
Gleichschaltung in Nazi Germany operated 
very much on all levels but was in important 
respects dependent on the use of language in 
order to manipulate and confuse. What was 
veiled by this change of wording was a massive 
breach with all previous notions of freedom, 
civil rights and self-government.
Victor Klemperer (1975) recorded that a cli-
mate of indifference characterized the German 
society of the Third Reich rather than any par-
ticular widespread or strongly articulated an-
nihilationist sentiment against people of Jewish 
belief. As interaction is a dialectical process 
and not a puppet-like response to some omnip-
otent external stimulus, it is important within 
this article to try to trace the interrelationships 
between ideology, propaganda, cultural pro-
duction and cultural consumption.
The populist machinery around Blair, his 
‘spin’, were/are all trying to present an ide-
ological commitment to a strong, visionary 
leader and were/are made manifest in propa-
ganda and other forms of cultural representa-
tion. The government’s attempts at ideologi-
cal manipulation via an image of vision are 
resorted to in the Home Offi ce Strategic Plan 
for communities: ‘The Home Offi ce and the 
services it oversees are united by a common 
vision of achieving social change. This is cap-
tured in our strategic objectives’ (Home Offi ce, 
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2004, p.9). In order to represent his ideologi-
cally-driven task of ‘winning the soul of [the] 
people’ (Mosse, 1966, p.8) and his self-image 
as a ‘man of destiny’, Hitler was often por-
trayed as a combination of, on the one hand, 
‘man of the people’ – shaking hands in the 
midst of crowds, amongst the workers – and, 
on the other hand, as a distant heroic leader, 
the ‘conscience of the nation’.
In his book, LTI – Lingua Tertii Imperii, Klem-
perer offers a profound critique of the language 
of the Third Reich. Born in 1881, Klemperer 
was head of Romance and Literature at the 
Technical University in Dresden, and had sev-
eral books published on seventeenth and eigh-
teenth century French literature before being 
expelled from his post in 1935. He was then 
forced to live in what were known as Jewish 
houses. Only because he was married to a non-
Jew was Klemperer able to remain free until 
receiving his deportation notice on 13 February 
1945. (Luckily, he was able to escape as Dres-
den was heavily bombed that night). He kept a 
diary of his experiences in which he focuses in 
detail on the changes in language and its uses 
in the Third Reich. These are published in two 
volumes: I Will Bear Witness – A Diary of the 
Nazi Years: 1933-1941 and To the Bitter End: 
1942-1945. Klemperer’s documentation of the 
language of the Third Reich observed sharply 
how Hitler and his government calculated with 
the numbness of broad parts of the population. 
New words that often sentimentalised and a 
constant representation of struggle allowed 
for intense manipulation. Similarly, notions 
of a ‘crisis in education’, of imminent terror 
and ‘criminal gangs’ etc., are fostered under 
New Labour while ‘solutions’ – represented 
as ‘choices’ and ‘concerns’ – are simply being 
dictated.
In New Labour rhetoric, there is always a ‘crisis’ 
in almost every fi eld, and therefore, always a need 
to ‘do something’, to ‘act’ and to ‘take the tough 
decisions’. ‘Crisis’ therefore sets in motion a dis-
turbingly standardised machine of institutional nor-
malisation, acting as the Trojan horse for turning 
each sector into another colony of the New Labour 
‘project’. (Robinson and Tormey, 2003, p.7)
The subjugation of the 
housing system
A good example of this project can be found 
in the recent case of the take-over of an Eng-
lish housing association – Solon Wandsworth 
Housing Association. Decision-making in 
respect of resource allocation and housing 
investment priorities have, since the Thatch-
er reforms of the 1980s, increasingly rest-
ed with the Housing Corporation and away 
from local government who, throughout the 
previous one hundred years, were primarily 
responsible for the provision of subsidised 
rented housing. The Housing Corporation is 
an unelected QUANGO responsible for the 
regulation of the English housing association 
movement, One aspect of the Housing Cor-
poration’s enhanced powers within English 
housing policy has been the imposition of 
the neo-liberal ideological hegemony on the 
housing association movement. An extreme 
example of this is the recent decision of the 
Housing Corporation to enforce a take-over 
of one housing provider – Solon Wandsworth 
Housing Association (SWHA), the last col-
lectively-run housing association in England. 
This case study (see Cooper 2004) also high-
lights the degree of violence that elements 
within the new managerialist class are pre-
pared to exert in imposing their ambitions.
SWHA had a good record of providing sustain-
able, high quality, affordable social housing 
over its 35-year history. However, it became 
a victim of the market discipline, primarily 
for not exploiting its commercial opportuni-
ties suffi ciently; or, in the words of a Hous-
ing Corporation appointee, in a suffi ciently 
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‘aggressive manner’ (TGWU, 2004, p.21), in 
accordance with the ‘common sense’ laws of 
neo-liberal political economy, even though 
such activities have contributed to the ‘re-
sidualisation’ of housing association estates 
(Burden et al. 2000). The main criticism in 
the Inquiry Report into SWHA (conducted 
under powers contained in the 1996 Housing 
Act) was, however, reserved for the collective 
management structure: 
Solon’s real weakness fl ows from the ineffective 
working of its collective institutions, which have 
proved ineffective and ineffi cient … Because the 
meetings endeavour to operate by consensus they 
take a very long time … [and] implementing deci-
sions is a matter of negotiation. (Cooke-Yarborough 
and Bohm, 2004, p.51)
This is a clear argument against democratic 
decision-making within organisations. Fol-
lowing the Inquiry, the Housing Corporation 
concluded that SWHA had ‘mismanaged’ and 
that its assets should be transferred to another 
housing association. Geoff Martin, the Batter-
sea and Wandsworth TUC organiser, described 
the Corporation’s actions as an ‘asset-stripping 
scandal’ (cited in Weaver, 2004, p.5):
It has been well known to everyone in the hous-
ing sector game that the plan was to destabilise 
Solon and to shift its lucrative asset base over to a 
favoured association that fi ts the housing corpora-
tion’s idea of a social housing provider. (Cited in 
Weaver, 2004, p.5)
The struggle between the Housing Corporation 
and SWHA comes close to the kind of confl ict 
between what Bourdieu would describe as ‘the 
left hand of the state’ (an egalitarian workforce 
struggling to maintain crucial social values 
such as collective democracy) and ‘the right 
hand of the state’:
[T]he total quality managers, the downsizers, the 
outsourcers, the auditors and the target-setters who, 
being in the political ascendant, found little need 
to disguise their distaste, indeed contempt, for the 
values and social practices to which the representa-
tives of the left hand of the state had devoted their 
lives. (Pitts, 2003, p.127)
This case demonstrates the selective way 
dominant ways of observing shape ‘common 
sense’ notions of understanding and being, and 
the policies and practices that subsequently 
emerge from these processes (see Cooper 2005 
for a further discussion of this). Presently, it 
appears that the new managerialist elite within 
the social policy making community feel able 
to operate in any way it thinks fi t, without fear 
of reproach. The Housing Corporation’s as-
sessment of SWHA was ‘legitimated’ through 
various consultancy reports presented as ‘ob-
jective’, ‘reasonable’ and ‘common sense’, 
hiding the ideological and anti-social assault 
on the organisation, based on a desire to impose 
a more ‘market-friendly’ hierarchical regime. 
This resembles what Paul McCarthy has identi-
fi ed as ‘“inappropriately coercive” managerial 
styles’ – otherwise known as bullying:
Our contention is that bullying behaviours by man-
agers in the era of restructuring arise in the context 
of a fundamental mission by organisations to deploy 
capital, equipment and people in a brutal struggle 
for effi ciency and profi t in turbulent market condi-
tions. (McCarthy, 1996, p.1)
The discourse of restructuring in the public 
sector draws on such liberal sentiments as 
‘fl exibility, excellence, fl attening organisa-
tional structures, and creativity’ (McCarthy, 
1996, p.5), thereby legitimating the change as 
acceptable and commonsense. However, this 
‘rhetoric of restructuring might both mask and 
reproduce the brutality surfacing in managers’ 
behaviours as they react to turbulent market 
conditions’ (McCarthy, 1996, p.3). Drawing 
on Bauman’s (1991) critique of the holocaust, 
Modernity and the Holocaust, in which he 
suggests that those responsible for the Nazi 
death camps were not evil or deviant people 
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but ‘ordinary men and women trying to ac-
quit themselves well of their ordinary duties’ 
(Bauman, cited in McCarthy, 1996, p.12), Mc-
Carthy argues:
We stand warned that ordinary duties carried out 
by ordinary managers exercising power in con-
temporary restructuring deemed to be natural, may 
produce in postmodern conditions, brutal outcomes 
which are seen by some people akin to soft fascism. 
(McCarthy, 1996, p.12)
The subjugation of the 
education system
Another good example of the New Labour 
project can be found in the measures they 
have taken to subjugate the British education 
system even further to the needs of ‘business’, 
confi rming the Labour leadership’s acceptance 
of human capital theory (Becker, 1975) and the 
argument that the role of the state is to foster 
conditions that encourage a growth in the stock 
of human capital – viz. a ‘well-trained’ work-
force. This is refl ected in New Labour’s White 
Paper on the Future of Higher Education (DES, 
2003). In his foreword to the Paper, Secretary 
of State Charles Clarke argues the need ‘to 
make better progress in harnessing knowledge 
to wealth creation …. To help turn ideas into 
successful businesses’ (DES, 2003, p.2). This 
translates into measures aimed at encourag-
ing ‘universities to work with employers’ and 
rewarding and supporting ‘Higher Education 
(HE) institutions working with business’ (DES, 
2003, p.6). There is also an emphasis given to 
embedding ‘employability’ and ‘career man-
agement skills’ into the curriculum across all 
higher education courses.
Robinson and Tormey offer an insightful dis-
course analysis of the White Paper to reveal 
what they term ‘the true nature’ not just of New 
Labour’s education policy – ‘the reduction of 
the educational “commons” to the status of 
vocational training for the needs of business’ 
– but also of the New Labour project more 
generally – ‘the coordination of economic and 
social life in the interests of capital’ (Robinson 
and Tormey, 2003, p.1). Rhetorically,
… the government presents the White Paper in an 
exciting language of ‘freedom’, ‘choice’, ‘opportu-
nity’ and ‘progress’. For instance, the government 
is offering universities ‘greater freedom’ (p.19), 
presenting ‘a radical picture of a freer future’ and 
promoting a ‘move towards new freedoms’ (p.21) 
…. In fact, the entire plan is built on coercion and 
manipulation, mainly using government control of 
resources to bribe and blackmail those involved in 
HE as well as future students into conforming to 
the government’s agenda. (Robinson and Tormey, 
2003, p.3).
Students will be forced to pay higher tuition 
fees (behave as effective ‘customers’ and ‘in-
vestors’) while HE institutions will be forced to 
become more enterprising (behave as effective 
‘businesses’). University funding is no longer 
an entitlement or right, but ‘conditional on con-
formity to the government’s agenda’ (Robin-
son and Tormey, 2003, p.4) – in New Labour’s 
case, fulfi lling the needs of business.
The limits of ‘science’ are 
those of the corporation/state
Political agendas and interests of corporations 
are increasingly hampering access to meaning-
ful and authentic fi ndings of research, both in 
the social sciences as well as in the natural 
sciences. An example of this is highlighted 
in Nick Cohen’s comments on a disturbing 
trend of authoritarianism with regards to the 
government’s reaction to ‘politically uncom-
fortable’ research fi ndings related to ‘anti-
 social behaviour’:
Caroline Hunter and Judy Nixon, academics at 
Sheffi eld Hallam University, examined councils 
and housing associations to see if they were jump-
ing to the orders of the hard men in Whitehall. 
They were, with vigour. A middle-aged couple 
were being threatened by a housing association … 
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although the complaints came from a neighbour 
who had taken against them from the day they ar-
rived. Others in the street said they did not cause 
any trouble …. The couple had been model tenants 
in their old house. Yet eviction beckoned. Instead 
of promising to prevent abuse, David Blunkett 
went wild when [Hunter and Nixon’s] fi ndings 
made the press …. The kind of academics who 
argued with his party would not live ‘within a 
million miles’ of anti-social families, he said. ‘If 
this is what our money is going on, it is time for a 
review of the funding of social science research’. 
(Cohen, 2000, p.1)
Furthermore,
On 2 February, [Blunkett] told the Economic and 
Social Research Council that universities which 
wanted ‘our’ money must get on message with the 
programme. Too much research was ‘seemingly 
perverse, driven by ideology paraded as intellectual 
inquiry or critique’. They were setting out ‘with the 
sole aim of collecting evidence proving a policy 
wrong’. (Cohen, 2000, p.3)
The implicit claim that Blair’s country would 
facilitate and foster ‘ideology-free’ research (if 
science could ever be neutral) is undermined 
by such pronouncements as these and those 
evident in other ‘research’ areas such as GM 
crops. As George Monbiot writes:
Last October [2003], 114 scientists, many of whom 
receive funding from the biotech industry, sent 
an open letter to the Prime Minister claiming that 
Britain’s lack of enthusiasm for GM crops ‘will 
inhibit our ability to contribute to scientifi c know-
ledge internationally’. Scientists specialising in 
this fi eld, they claimed, were being forced to leave 
the country to fi nd work elsewhere…. GM crops 
are not science. They are technological products 
of science. To claim, as Tony Blair and several 
senior scientists have done, that those who oppose 
GM are ‘anti-science’ is like claiming that those 
who oppose chemical weapons are anti-chemistry. 
Scientists are under no greater obligation to defend 
GM food than they are to defend the manufacture 
of Barbie dolls. (Monbiot, 2004a, p.1)
The ‘crimes of obedience, material conven-
ience and opportunism’ conducted by some 
members of the scientifi c establishment in 
communion with both the government and 
corporations are multiple in the contempo-
rary UK. In another piece, Monbiot discusses 
the case of Dr. Andrew Wakefi eld, the doctor 
who ended up having to leave the UK after a 
political, publicly arranged socio-professional 
‘assassination’, and refers not only to our lack 
of choices in terms of health care (in this case, 
alternatives to the MMR vaccine other than 
those privately searched and paid for) but also 
the shocking state of both the US and UK sci-
entifi c establishment.
Just as Wakefi eld was being burnt in effi gy over 
the weekend, a much bigger story passed by al-
most unnoticed. The Union of Concerned Scientists 
released a report showing how American science 
has been systematically nobbled by George Bush. 
(Monbiot, 2004b, p.1)
Whenever research confl icts with corporate 
interests, it is suppressed. So the process of 
Gleichschaltung, while not completed, even 
extends itself to our very physique:
A study of research papers examining the side-ef-
fects of a class of heart drugs called calcium chan-
nel blockers found that 96% of the researchers who 
said they were safe had fi nancial relationships with 
the manufacturers, as opposed to 37% of those who 
raised concerns. (Monbiot, 2004b, p.2)
Referring to Sarah Boseley’s 2002 article, 
‘Scandal of Scientists Who Take Money for 
Papers Ghostwritten by Drug Companies’, 
Monbiot states that:
British and US scientists are putting their names 
to papers they have not written. The papers are 
‘ghosted’ or co-written by employees of the drugs 
companies, then signed, for a handsome fee, by re-
spectable researchers. In some cases, the researchers 
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have not even seen the raw data on which the papers’ 
conclusions are based. (Monbiot, 2004b, p.2)
The production of ‘truth’ obviously extends it-
self throughout British society and, while criti-
cal articles and books are still published, more 
widely available and read materials that pass as 
‘truth’ are mere propaganda in Blair’s country. 
As Monbiot has also argued in respect to news 
reporting over the decision to attack Iraq:
Andrew Gilligan, the BBC reporter who claimed 
that the government had sexed up the intelligence 
about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, was 
mostly right. Much of the rest of the media, which 
took the doctored intelligence at face value, was 
wrong. The reward for getting it right was pub-
lic immolation and the sack. The punishment for 
getting it wrong was the usual annual bonus. No 
government commissions inquiries to discover why 
reporters reproduce the government’s lies. (Mon-
biot, 2004c, p.1)
As Monbiot explains:
Much of the problem here is that certain falsehoods 
have slipped into the political language. The Guard-
ian, for example, has claimed on nine occasions that 
the weapons inspectors were expelled from Iraq in 
1998 …. (Monbiot, 2004c, p.1)
In truth,
… the inspectors were withdrawn by the UN, after 
the US insisted that they should leave Iraq for their 
own safety. (Monbiot, 2004c, p.1)
After citing many examples of such ‘news’ 
reporting in various media, Monbiot argues 
that such lies are so often repeated by govern-
ment that they seem ‘almost impossible to kill’ 
(Monbiot, 2004c, p.1).
Such tools of ideological homogenisation and 
de-politisation can account, in combination 
with the mind numbing effects of consumer-
ism, to some extent for the apolitical drift of 
much of US and UK populations alike that is 
often sadly commented upon. As Monbiot also 
argues, particularly since 9/11 and the war on 
Iraq, little by little democracy in the UK is 
being banned:
The government will neither regulate itself nor 
be regulated by the institutions which surround 
it. Parliament chose to believe a string of obvious 
lies. The media repeated them, the civil service let 
them pass, the judiciary endorsed them. (Monbiot, 
2004d, p.1)
In this context, political action, or even verbal 
expression as part of the democratic process, 
are not welcomed (for instance, during the 
war conducted against Iraq vice-chancellors 
of some universities actively suppressed the 
free speech of both academic staff as well as 
student societies and similar silencing/demoni-
sation of dissent occurred in schools) and, as 
will be elaborated on later on in this article, 
may even now be criminalised.
As part of the ‘globalisation of Evil’ (Scheerer, 
2002), even more incredible and dangerous 
interventions by the state and its ‘servants’ are 
believable, marking the decline of democracy. 
As Norman Dombey remarked:
In the light of the evidence of the Hutton Inquiry, 
it is entirely believable that MI6 helped Downing 
Street to persuade the British public that there was 
a case for war, just as the Offi ce of Special Plans 
in the Pentagon was doing in the United States 
…. MI6 has long experience in the dissemina-
tion of forged documents to make a political case. 
(Dombey, 2004, p.3)
Fears of ‘disorder’, ‘terror’ 
and the ‘anti-social criminal’
Another area where notions of crisis have been 
used to impose authoritarian measures is in 
policy debates around ‘community safety’ and 
the way moral interpretations of ‘danger’ are 
being accepted in British society and made to 
appear self-evidently reasonable. Although 
concern with ‘dangerous’ and ‘threatening’ 
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behaviour has a long tradition going back to 
the social investigations and commentaries 
of the mid nineteenth century – Mayhew’s 
(1861/1967) London, for instance – more and 
more forms of behaviour which in former times 
might have been considered a ‘nuisance’ are 
now being criminalised in the name of commu-
nity safety. Community safety (as opposed to 
‘crime prevention’) was adopted by many local 
authority-led partnerships set up in the 1980s 
to tackle neighbourhood crime – even though 
such initiatives received little support from the 
then Conservative government, ideologically 
hostile to the idea of giving local government 
a stronger role in crime control. Following the 
Conservative government’s rejection of the 
recommendations of the Home Offi ce Stand-
ing Conference on Crime Prevention Report 
1991 (the Morgan Report), which advocated 
a stronger coordinating role for local govern-
ment, it was left to New Labour to take over 
the mantle for community safety.
The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act gave local 
authorities new duties to set up strategic part-
nerships with the police to tackle crime and 
disorder in their locality. In carrying out these 
duties, crime and disorder partnerships are 
expected to consult with all sections of the 
local ‘community’ – generating the merely 
ideological impression of general consent. 
However, community itself is a highly con-
tested concept. For some, community may be 
‘suffocatingly homogenous and intolerant of 
difference’ (Hoggett, 1997, p.14) – in which 
case, a community safety strategy may seem 
a haven for some whilst representing exclu-
sion for others. Moreover, community safety 
strategies are largely being driven by a perfor-
mance management agenda where ‘cost-effec-
tive measures for the realisation of specifi c out-
comes and reduction targets are prioritised … 
“SMART” targets … “specifi c”, “measurable”, 
“achievable”, “realistic” and “time-tabled”’ 
(Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002, p.60). Con-
sequently, the pressure to deliver ‘what works’ 
and minimise costs will be prioritised over 
more imaginative solutions aimed at tackling 
the structural causes of social problems, ideo-
logically constructed and presented as ‘crime 
and disorder’. 
The 1998 Act refl ected New Labour’s keen-
ness to be seen to be tough on crime. It there-
fore included a range of initiatives targeting 
‘anti-social behaviour’ such as measures aimed 
at ‘unfi t’ parents (parenting orders) and their 
‘feral’ children (child safety orders, curfew 
orders and the removal of truants to designated 
places). It also introduced Anti-social Behav-
iour Orders (ASBOs), a civil order that can be 
served by the police or a local authority on any 
person aged 10 years or over who has acted 
in an ‘anti-social manner’ – that is, a manner 
that caused or was thought likely to cause ha-
rassment, alarm or distress. If a person does 
anything which he or she is prohibited from 
doing by an ASBO they face imprisonment or 
a fi ne. Therefore, although ASBO proceedings 
are civil in nature, a breach of an ASBO is a 
criminal offence that can incur up to fi ve years 
imprisonment (Sykes, 2003). The 2003 White 
Paper, Respect and Responsibility: taking a 
stand against anti-social behaviour (Home 
Offi ce, 2003), extended ASBOs to begging 
– thereby criminalising one strategy out of 
poverty (justifi ed in the name of ‘respect’).
In September 2003 the fi rst national census of 
anti-social behaviour was launched with numer-
ous agencies from police to street cleaners required 
to record any ‘undesirable’ behaviour. Within 13 
broad headings the ‘anti-social’ included a diverse 
array of behaviours from prostitution and vandal-
ism to littering, noise, swearing, begging and street 
drinking. All of these measures might be described 
as ‘defi ning deviance up’, but with the paradoxical 
result that public tolerance to incivility is progres-
sively lowered and public fear of [in particular] 
young people signifi cantly increased. (Muncie, 
2004, pp.237-238)
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There can be no mistake about the many ways 
in which the New Labour government uses 
language to manipulate and confuse its popu-
lation. Often, this appears to be done to popu-
larise repressive measures.
 Apart from the clear abuse of the political 
party name, the present government of the UK 
is continuously engaging in a rhetoric that is 
mystifying crucial realities. The decontextual-
ized use of already vague concepts allows for 
dangerous manipulations and populism. In the 
foreword to the Home Offi ce Strategic Plan 
2004-08, Confi dent communities in a secure 
Britain, Blair claims that:
Like other developed countries we still face dif-
fi cult challenges from drug addiction, from vio-
lent crime and anti-social behaviour and from the 
very real threat of international terrorism. (Blair, 
2004, p.5)
He draws a dramatic and hysterical picture of 
history before New Labour that can be seen 
to parallel the populism used by the Nazis 
that claimed that Weimar had been soft on 
crime but now the decent German populace 
would be spared such degrees of criminality 
and licentiousness (see also Gellately, 2001). 
According to Blair:
Across the country decent families and communi-
ties were close to give up the struggle against the 
thugs and vandals who made their lives a misery. 
Vulnerable people felt prisoners in their homes …. 
Putting this right, tackling crime and the fear of 
crime, was never going to be achieved overnight. 
(Blair, 2004, p.5)
Apart from the drama and irrationality of mix-
ing ‘crime’ with ‘fear of crime’, the so-called 
solutions to these diverse but mystifi ed social 
phenomena consisted not only of a decrease of 
justice possibilities in courts – as well as more 
and more policing and surveillance on a formal 
level of social control – but also a terrifying 
increase and encouragement for forms of infor-
mal/formalised social controls within so-called 
‘local communities’. Apart from the fact that, 
as stated before, community is in itself a con-
tested concept – and even David Blunkett won-
ders: ‘How can we reduce crime and anti-social 
behaviour at a time when traditional commu-
nity bonds are loosening?’ (Blunkett, 2004, 
p.7) – this concept is taken to new heights of 
emotive, political exploitation:
[W]e want to revive the idea of community policing, 
but for a modern world …. And we’ll give commu-
nities a real say in deciding the priorities for the new 
neighbourhood policing teams, and more in dealing 
with anti-social behaviour. (Blair, 2004, p.5)
This ‘revival’ is historically and politically 
highly suspicious, and thus reminds us once 
again of processes within the Third Reich. The 
notion of Volksgemeinschaft, for example, was 
another important element of Nazi ideology 
as it evoked images of the secure and stable 
national homeland, and of a spiritual commu-
nity to which Hitler and the Nazis would lead 
the German people. Although it is perhaps a 
little too much to suggest that post-depres-
sion Germany had a ‘craving for the return to 
the womb of community’ (Grunberger, 1974, 
p.67), it is clear that the Nazis were using feel-
ings of insecurity alongside their idealisation 
of a Volkgemeinschaft where equality, stability 
and reciprocity were promised for all.
The Gestapo would have been unable to func-
tion effectively without widespread public sup-
port. The common practices of denunciations 
of fellow citizens and relatives alike by mem-
bers of the public (Blunkett’s ‘law-abiding citi-
zens’ one must assume) were the basis of many 
a Gestapo investigation. It was in this way that 
the National Socialist state succeeded in polic-
ing even intimate aspects of personal behav-
iour. As intended, these denunciations made 
social and/or sexual relations between people 
of Jewish belief and Christians, or Germans 
and foreign forced labourers, very diffi cult and 
dangerous to have and maintain. Having gay 
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relationships, as well as unguarded criticism of 
the regime, became utterly dangerous, even in 
the apparent privacy of the home. The reasons 
why people denounced other people varied, 
sometimes refl ecting actual, active support for 
the ideologies of National Socialism, but often 
revealing an apolitical sense of public duty or 
plainly personal motives such as material gain, 
revenge and/or jealousy (Gellately, 2001). 
Moreover, in Germany, in contrast to ‘Blair’s 
Britain’, the ability of the Nazi state to de-
liver – however brutally achieved – depended 
on certain material commitments. These had 
been enshrined in the Weimar Constitution as 
moral imperatives – for example, the right to a 
job and social security. The provision of these 
helped further to generate consent in Nazi so-
ciety in combination with the popularisation of 
repressive police measures.
In Britain, even peaceful dissent and protest 
will now be criminalised as:
The Home Offi ce proposes ‘to make it an offence 
to protest outside homes in such a way that causes 
harassment, alarm or distress to residents’…. [T]he 
police can defi ne ‘harassment, alarm or distress’ 
however they wish. All protest in residential areas, 
in other words, could now be treated as a criminal 
offence …. The government will also seek to ‘sug-
gest remedies’ for websites which ‘include material 
deemed to cause concern or needless anxiety to 
others’. (Monbiot, 2004d, p.1)
John Upton elaborates on the process of ‘nor-
malisation’ of so-called ‘emergency powers’ 
in relation to the introduction of the Terror-
ism Act:
First, a law introduced as a temporary measure is 
transformed in due course into a permanent piece 
of legislation. Second, a symbiotic relationship 
develops between the ordinary criminal law and 
emerging legislation as elements of one are incor-
porated into the other – and the effect is a general 
tightening up of the statutory criminal law. Finally, 
emergency powers are used to deal with ordinary 
crime. (Upton, 2004, p.12)
Moreover, emergency measures can be used 
against protesters who want to express their 
opposition to government politics. Since the 
drafting of the Terrorism Act, peaceful pro-
testers in Britain have already been arrested 
as potential terrorists.
 This phenomena of the ‘normalisation’ of 
ideas and practices which might otherwise 
seem unacceptable can again be related back 
to the Third Reich. There, the ‘Nazifi cation’ of 
social life implied the infusion of Nazi ideol-
ogy and practice into everyday social discourse 
and practices that generated a symbolic frame-
work and an intense pressure of conformity.
 A socio-political and cultural conformity 
in a society where non-conformity is publicly 
punished by the agents of the state, and where 
the range of cultural expression is increasingly 
limited, is now also a characteristic of Blair’s 
Britain. The highly repressive Anti-Terror-
ism, Crime and Security Act, made law in 
December 2001, represented a distortion of the 
criminal law as it introduced a distinction be-
tween ‘crimes’ and ‘terrorism’ on the basis of 
motives of ‘criminal’ activities. Upton pointed 
to another highly dangerous and obviously thus 
necessarily vague dimension of this Act:
Part IV of the new Act allows the Home Secretary 
to detain international terrorists indefi nitely and 
without trial. Who qualifi es as an international 
terrorist is, for the purposes of the Act, determined 
by the Home Secretary’s suspicions. A person may 
also be detained if he is suspected of having ‘links’ 
(not defi ned in the Act) to a terrorist group. So it is 
possible to be detained merely for being suspected 
of having links with suspicious people. (Upton, 
2004, p.16)
This again has parallels to the Third Reich and 
obviously links nicely with the encouragement 
of community policing, the acceptance of ‘hear 
say’ evidence and the generation of a ‘culture 
of denunciation’.
 Last but not least, the Civil Contingen-
cies Bill (which received Royal Assent on 18 
November 2004) – which seeks to ‘deliver a 
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single framework for civil protection in the 
United Kingdom to meet the challenges of 
the twenty fi rst century’ (Cabinet Offi ce, un-
dated, p.1) – again used language that left 
much scope for interpretation and manipula-
tion (in a country already riddled with ‘spin’ 
and other serial governmental deceptions and 
lies). An emergency situation herein is defi ned 
as ‘an event or situation which threatens seri-
ous damage to human welfare, the environment 
or the security of the UK or a part or region’ 
(cited in Upton, 2004, p.19). Equally, the list 
of interventions in the state’s power to control 
in such an ‘emergency situation’ is once again 
suitably vague:
By Clause 21, a government may ‘provide for or 
enable’ the requisition or destruction of property 
(with or without compensation); the prohibition or 
requirement of movement to or from a specifi ed 
place; the prohibition of assemblies of specifi ed 
kinds at specifi ed places or at specifi ed times; the 
prohibition of travel at specifi ed times; and last but 
not least, the prohibition of ‘other specifi ed activi-
ties’. (Upton, 2004, p.19)
Commenting on the overall impact of the Ter-
rorism Act, the Civil Contingencies Bill and 
the Criminal Justice Bill, Upton remarks:
These powers, which may be used if a government 
judges there is suffi cient threat not only to the na-
tion but to a part of the nation alone, would be a 
powerful weapon in any totalitarian state’s armoury. 
Here is the key to the absolute control of the nation 
that Blunkett, in his lighter moments, must dream 
of. (Upton, 2004, p.20)
In contrast, David Blunkett himself represents 
these measures as an opportunity:
[W]e are in a unique position to play a powerful 
part in developing trust and security in society with 
the law-abiding citizen at its heart…. That is why 
security runs like a thread throughout the Home 
Offi ce’s work; on the one hand, protecting ourselves 
from international terrorists while also ensuring the 
police and communities have the tools they need 
to establish order and security in their neighbour-
hoods. (Blunkett, 2004, p.7)
Disregarding the rights of 
‘others’
The move towards the intolerant society under 
New Labour also extends towards an attack on 
multiculturalism. Following ‘riots’ in northern 
English towns in the summer of 2001, the gov-
ernment commissioned the Cantle Report to 
investigate the causes of the disorder. Instead 
of emphasising the poverty, inequality and 
racism that divides society, the Cantle Report 
saw the way forward as ‘community cohesion’ 
(Home Offi ce, 2001).
Community cohesion … is about helping micro-
communities to gel or mesh into an integrated 
whole. These divided communities would need to 
develop common goals and a shared vision. (Home 
Offi ce, 2001, p.70)
Kundnani is critical of this prescription:
It provides a new formula, in which the separate cul-
tural development that had been encouraged for de-
cades is to be subsumed to the demands of ‘commu-
nity cohesion’. A set of core values is to put limits 
on multiculturalism and black people are required 
to develop ‘a greater acceptance of the principal 
national institutions’. (Kundnani, 2002, p.3)
Following Cantle, Blunkett called on immi-
grants to take an ‘oath of allegiance’ to the 
British state and to adopt British norms. The 
‘blame’ for tensions between ethnic groups 
is placed on the shoulders of ethnic minori-
ties themselves and their ‘inability’ to inte-
grate with the British way of life. Immigrants 
must assimilate into New Labour’s brand of 
‘community’ – homogenised and Anglo-Saxon 
– even though it is that same community that 
discriminates against them (Cooper, 2005).
Through conceptualising asylum seekers as 
‘bogus’ welfare dependants, politicians and 
parts of the media have been responsible for 
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generating racist and xenophobic violence 
against black immigrants. The dominant dis-
course on asylum has become particularly 
hostile recently, generating a ‘criminogenic 
context’ at a time of welfare retrenchment 
(Bloch and Schuster, 2002). Cohen identifi es 
various metaphors used by the media, portray-
ing asylum seekers as either ‘natural disasters’ 
(fl ooding, deluging and swamping) or ‘crimi-
nals’ (bogus liars) (Cohen, 2002). Politicians 
and other public fi gures have been quick to 
jump on the bandwagon: David Blunkett spoke 
of asylum seekers ‘swamping’ British schools 
(The Today Programme, BBC Radio 4, 25 
April 2002). Chris Fox, president of the As-
sociation of Chief Police Offi cers, argued that 
the number of refugees entering Britain had 
reached ‘tidal wave’ proportions, bringing with 
it ‘a whole new type of crime, from the Nige-
rian fraudster, to the eastern European who 
deals in drugs and prostitution to the Jamaican 
concentration on drug dealing’ (‘Immigrants 
“behind crime wave” – police’, The Observer, 
18 May 2003, p.1). The Race and Violent 
Crime Task Force and the Commission for 
Racial Equality have both argued that there is a 
direct relationship between political rhetoric on 
race and immigration, and increases in racist 
violence (Bloch and Schuster 2002). In a report 
to the UN Human Rights Committee, 11 Brit-
ish organisations, led by the civil rights group 
Liberty argued that ‘politicians and media alike 
have been encouraging racist hostility in their 
public attitudes towards asylum seekers’ (cited 
in The Observer, 1 July 2001, p.1). Moreover, 
two reports in 2005 – one from the European 
commissioner for human rights and one from 
Amnesty International – both questioned the 
legality of Britain’s policy of detaining asylum 
seekers in detention centres (Dodd, 2005). 
Apart from the increasing diffi culties of fi nding 
asylum in Britain and apart from the pressures 
of assimilation, immigrants now face added 
danger from the fact that anti-terror legislation 
has been grafted on to immigration law. While 
‘due process’ has almost become a meaning-
less phrase, immigrants now are left with no 
safeguards whatsoever against the powers of 
the British state.
As if these developments were not bad enough, 
it is important to further mention one of the 
most brutal human rights violations within 
this country – the illegitimate detention of 
‘suspected international terrorists’ in Belmarsh 
and Woodhill after 2001. As mentioned above, 
this fate could await anyone now as ‘suspicion’ 
is a more than vague concept (apart from the 
fact that a ‘reasonable belief’, as defi ned by the 
Home Secretary, is likely to be of questionable 
‘rationality’). However, if nothing else in the 
long list of atrocities mentioned in this article 
does, the fact that we live in a country in which 
13 people have had to live in cruel, degrad-
ing and inhuman conditions without charge, 
without trial and without prospect of release 
should make us realise that we in Britain no 
longer live in a democracy.
Re-reading/re-contextualising 
Foucault’s ‘specifi c intellectual’
While the inherent problems of the notion of the 
‘universal intellectual’ (see Thorpe 2004) are 
clear, the present Gleichschaltung of all areas 
of economic and social life in the interests of 
capital does appear to validate a modifi cation 
of the ‘specifi c intellectual’ (Foucault, 1977) 
as the need to mobilise academic and public 
resistance becomes more and more pressing. 
As demonstrated above, through processes 
similar to the Third Reich’s Gleichschaltung, 
socio-political and cultural relations in Britain 
have been radically restructured in accord with 
the demands of an unfettered capitalist neo-
liberal regime. Neo-liberalism has come to 
dominate all aspects of economic, social and 
political life, leading to closure (hegemony) in 
public debate and, consequently, the erosion 
of democracy. These processes clearly present, 
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as Pierre Bourdieu (1998) argues, a threat to 
any possibility of a civilised society associ-
ated with equal rights to welfare, education, 
health, arts and culture, work and so forth. 
It is also possible to interpret these dramatic 
processes and their results in terms of ‘cultu-
recide’. As Stein explains, culturecide is also 
referred to as:
… cultural genocide or deculturation, [and] signi-
fi es processes that have usually been purposely 
introduced that result in the decline or demise of a 
culture, without necessarily resulting in the physi-
cal destruction of its bearers…. Culturecide is most 
often used to describe the experiences of many 
indigenous peoples. As Arens notes, deculturation, 
‘can involve some or all of the following: political 
and social institutions, culture, language, national 
feelings, religion, economic stability, personal secu-
rity, liberty, health and dignity’. Diverse authorities 
have noted the impact of policies implemented by 
colonising powers on native populations. (Stein, 
2003, p.1 – original emphasis)
It is with this context in mind that this article 
will now refl ect upon the role of ‘the intellec-
tual’ in what is a desperately needed challenge 
to the oppressive violence of the neo-liberal 
‘new order’. Here, Foucault’s reading of the 
role of the ‘specifi c intellectual’ offers a use-
ful starting point.
Foucault considered that the role of the in-
tellectual was to study power in its immedi-
ate relationship (its localised context) with 
its ‘object, its target, its fi eld of application’ 
(Foucault, 1980, p.97). However, it is diffi cult 
to simply apply this to the present context of 
Gleichschaltung which extends far beyond 
the local. While it is clear why Foucault re-
jected the notion and practice of the ‘univer-
sal intellectual’ – both because people have 
experience, knowledge and understanding of 
their own contexts, and do not need a patron-
izing intellectual to guide them, and because 
of the dangerous legacy of Oppenheimer, who 
represented this ‘universal intellectual’ (see 
Thorpe 2004) – the present Gleichschaltung 
of all areas of economic and social life in the 
interests of capital does appear to validate a 
modifi cation of the ‘specifi c intellectual’.
Blacker claimed about Foucault’s work that:
… what he has to say is of particular relevance 
and importance to – and is even tailor-made for 
– intellectuals engaged in research within an insti-
tutional setting such as the contemporary university. 
(Blacker, 1998, p.348)
As demonstrated above and in other contexts 
(see for instance Beckmann and Cooper, 2004 
and 2005), academic engagement in critical 
research and practice has become increasingly 
diffi cult. The role of the oppositional intel-
lectual in this changed context does require 
a more broad, directly political and public 
engagement. In order not to appear too patron-
izing, it is perhaps advisable to refer to a quote 
of Foucault himself: ‘People know what they 
do; they frequently know why they do what 
they do; but what they don’t know is what what 
they do does’ (Foucault, cited in Popkewitz 
and Brennan, 1998, p.359)
The relationship between culture, power and 
knowledge has to be redefi ned by shifting the 
political emphasis away from struggles over 
curricula to struggles over policy that shapes 
the institutional conditions under which aca-
demic knowledge is produced and under which 
public debates are increasingly stifl ed. In a so-
cietal context that is marked by a widespread 
disengagement with social and political con-
cerns and characterized by ‘unprecedented lev-
els of cynicism and discontent with politicians 
and politics in major Western democracies’ 
(Pearce and Tombs, 1998, p.34) – in which 
for many, consumerist dreams have replaced 
interests in values and ethics – it is hard to 
imagine that people will be able to fi nd the 
motivation to revolt. Even if they do – such as 
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the supporters of the Animal Liberation Front 
– they become demonized and criminalised. 
The repressive powers of the state have gone 
haywire and, as Upton states, with the Terror-
ism Act, ‘the Civil Contingencies Bill and the 
Criminal Justice Bill, the Home Offi ce has, in 
a very short space of time, produced a com-
pendium of legislation to keep the whole popu-
lation well and truly in order’ (Upton, 2004, 
p.19). Thus, other changes certainly occurred 
in terms of Foucault’s belief that the power of 
the state masks a substantial part of itself. ‘Its 
success is proportional to its ability to hide its 
own mechanisms. Would power be accepted if 
it were entirely cynical? For it, secrecy is not 
in the nature of an abuse; it is indispensable to 
its operation’ (Foucault, 1990, p.86)
In the context of the growing, blatant cor-
poratization and privatization of education, 
academics should defend the university as a 
crucial democratic public sphere, as discourses 
are not just referential or representational sys-
tems but part of the infrastructure ordering 
practices of and in a society. As Pearce and 
Tombs elaborate:
… the more that the control of the media is exclu-
sively in the hands of private business corporations 
and the greater the degree of concentration of media 
ownership, the easier it will be for a small select 
group of persuaders to dictate the agenda for public 
debate and political action. (Pearce and Tombs, 
1998, p. 28)
Foucault rightly de-legitimated ‘traditional’ 
liberal authorities who abused their power in 
defi ning ‘the political’ on behalf of absolute 
beliefs for the individual (everyone) through 
a critique of the formation of expertise that is 
utilized to create a basis for claims of authority. 
Herein he saw the crucial difference between 
resistance and liberation. However, as the cur-
rent situation negates basic democratic values, 
it is suggested that Foucault’s understanding of 
the ‘specifi c intellectual’ needs some modifi ca-
tion without falling back into the trappings of 
the ‘universal intellectual’. While intellectuals 
should relate their core concerns to specifi c 
localised contexts, it is crucial that they also 
collectively fi ght for a non-party space for the 
public expression of ethically governed poli-
tics. It is important for academics to develop 
an ethical relationship that defeats corporate 
authoritarianism and other forms of domina-
tion. As Barry Smart argues:
Neoliberalism and the associated idea of a global 
free market economy have acquired a predeter-
mined and self-evident character for policy makers, 
analysts and commentators. It is one of the more 
important tasks of social theory to expose both the 
fragile foundations of such a conception of eco-
nomic life and the harmful social consequences 
that have followed from its policy implementation. 
(Smart, 2003, p.174)
Even according to Foucault, the ‘political task’ 
should be:
… to criticize the working of institutions which ap-
pear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize 
them in such a manner that the political violence 
which has always exercised itself obscurely through 
them will be unmasked, so that one can fi ght them. 
(Foucault, cited in Chomsky and Foucault, 1974, 
p.171)
It is therefore more the ways in which intel-
lectuals engage, and obviously the (universal-
istic) claim that democracy and ethics have to 
be re-established, that is the necessary modi-
fi cation to Foucault’s notion of the ‘specifi c 
intellectual’.
Compartmentalization between scientifi c and po-
litical decision-making in practice results in non-
decisions, which are by default decisions to submit 
to the technological imperative. In this way ‘can’ 
becomes ‘ought’ (Bauman, 1993: 186-90). This 
process of evasion of responsibility, as Bauman 
argues, has been at the heart of modernity (Bauman, 
[1989] 2000: 151-200; Forman, 1994). (Thorpe, 
2004, p.78)
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It is thus important to redefi ne the role of 
academics as engaged public intellectuals 
who aim to trigger, stimulate and broaden 
public discourses and practices about the 
meaning of the contested concepts of de-
mocracy, citizenship and social justice that, 
in the present context, have become muted 
or gleichgeschalted. It was the Dreyfus affair 
that sparked the emergence of the Manifeste 
des intellectuals in 1897 and, in 1898, Emile 
Zola published the fi rst of a series of open 
letters to the President of the French Repub-
lic entitled ‘J’accuse’. It is now time to pub-
licly accuse the British government before it 
is too late.
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